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TEACHING FOR AMERICA:
UNIONS AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Charlotte Garden*
INTRODUCTION

M

UCH of the current controversy regarding the rights and
responsibilities of public-sector employees and their unions has
focused on elementary and secondary school teachers. On one side of that
controversy, critics of teachers and their unions argue that teachers are overpaid
civil servants and that their unions' focus on wages and working conditions
comes at the expense of students' learning. On the other side, teachers' unions
and their supporters focus on the unique role educators play in forming the next
generation of citizens and the need to adequately support teachers in fulfilling
that role. Implicit in this discourse are two distinct characterizations of teachers:
as governmental employees following directives laid down by school boards and
principals; and as semi-free agents charged with expertly carrying out a
democratic mission. While these characterizations are not mutually exclusive,
they implicate different values that can stand in tension with one another. For
example, if teachers are characterized primarily as governmental employees,
employers' directives will be paramount in determining how teachers should
perform their jobs, even when they are ill-advised; on the other hand, if teachers
are characterized primarily as agents of democracy, students' interests, together
with those of society writ-large, will be the focus.
These discursive strands are also present in courts' treatment of teachers'
First Amendment rights. Some decisions focus on teachers as employees whose
work performance is subject to employer control. Others find significance in
teachers' democratic role and focus on the fact that teachers are charged with
implementing the vision and values of their communities as articulated by elected
school board members. Many courts combine these two strands to articulate a
particularly narrow scope of teachers' First Amendment rights, disregarding
tensions between the strands.
These decisions are of great relevance to the present debate regarding the
proper role of teachers. First, the decisions themselves reflect the competing
values implicated in that debate. Second, the limits that courts impose on
* Assistant Professor, Seattle University School of Law. I would like to thank the editors of
the University of Toledo Law Review for the invitation to be part of the Symposium as well as for
their careful editing of this article. I would also like to thank the participants in that Symposium.
and the Sixth Annual Labor and Employment Colloquium-particularly Scott Bauries, Timothy
Glynn and Nancy Leong-for their helpful comments on the article.

HeinOnline -- 43 U. Tol. L. Rev. 563 2011-2012

UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 43

teachers' speech rights in and out of the classroom affect the educational goals
that teachers may choose to pursue and the means they use to achieve them.
Teachers' classroom performances can alter public (and judicial) expectations
regarding the role of teachers more generally, leading to a self-reinforcing cycle.
Third, if teachers can no longer unionize and bargain with their employers to
protect their speech in the classroom, the First Amendment's floor of protection
will become increasingly important.
I begin this article by describing the existing First Amendment protection
for teachers' curricular speech by exploring three cases upholding school
districts' decisions to punish teachers for teaching controversial material. I then
suggest that because existing precedent does not offer meaningful protections for
teachers' speech, collectively bargained protections for academic freedom may
be the best available method for shielding teachers who make reasonable
pedagogical decisions delegated to them by school administrators. Finally, I
conclude the article by proposing that collectively bargained academic freedom
provisions can serve the best interests of not just teachers, but also students,
parents, and school boards.
I. THE DEBATE OVER TEACHERS AND TEACHERS' UNIONS

Public-sector employees
generally-and especially teachers-are
increasingly under public scrutiny. Much of this scrutiny has focused on teacher
tenure, a phrase that encompasses a set of due-process protections for teachers,
including the provision that they can be fired only for cause.' For example, such
diverse media outlets as The New Yorker? and the Wall Street JournaP have
criticized teacher tenure as protecting incompetent-or worse, abusiveteachers. Other media attention has focused on whether teachers' pay and
benefits are inflated compared to what they might receive in comparable private
sector jobs. 4 Relatedly, teachers and teachers' unions are losing their position as
valued political constituencies, or at the very least, many politicians have
concluded that the benefits of pursuing policies that teachers oppose are worth
risking losing teachers' support. For example, New Jersey governor Chris
Christie made political hay out of his bad relationship with the New Jersey

1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1481 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "tenure" as "a status afforded to a
teacher or professor as a protection against summary dismissal without sufficient cause").
2. See Steven Brill, The Rubber Room: The Battle Over New York City's Worst Teachers,
NEW YORKER, Aug. 31, 2009, at 20.
3. See Fran Tarkenton, What if the NFL Played by Teachers' Rules?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3,
2011, at Al7.
4. E.g., Andrew G Biggs & Jason Richwine, Average Public School Teacher Is Paid Too
Much, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 9, 2011, http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/are-teachersoverpaid/average-public-school-teacher-is-paid-too-much; John Stossel, 20/20: Myth: TeachersAre
Underpaid
(ABC
television
broadcast
May
12,
2006),
http://abcnews.go.com/2020/Stossel/story?id=1955153. Cf Valerie Strauss, Are School Teachers
Paid Too Much?, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2011, at B2.
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teachers' union, 5 and got spontaneous applause after he told a teacher that if she
was unhappy with her salary, she should quit her job.6 Republicans are not alone
in alienating teachers-under President Obama, Education Secretary Arne
Duncan has implemented a series of plans, including the showcase Race to the
Top Initiative, which the National Education Association has condemned as
"appall[ing]."
Closely related to this phenomenon, a number of states are pursuing reform
efforts that would limit or eliminate teacher tenure, reduce teachers' pay and
benefits (often along with the benefits of other public-sector employees), require
teachers to work longer hours, and limit the abilities of teachers and public-sector
employees to bargain collectively. 8 In Illinois, Governor Pat Quinn recently
signed a law requiring teachers to work a longer school day and making it more
difficult for teachers to vote to strike. 9 In Providence, Rhode Island, the mayor
fired all 1,926 public school teachers-though many could expect to be rehired,'0
the symbolism behind this gesture was unmistakable." Florida enacted a bill
that, among other things, excludes new teachers from "just cause" protections
from firing, limits teachers' collective-bargaining rights, and ties teacher
compensation to student performance on statewide tests.' 2 Perhaps the most
well-known reform effort, Wisconsin's so-called "Budget Repair Bill,"
substantially limited collective bargaining rights for select public-sector workers,
including teachers.' 3 And in Ohio, Senate Bill 5-later repealed by voterswould have limited teachers' and other public-sector workers' collective
bargaining rights, banned public employee strikes, and imposed benefit cuts,

5. Bradley Blackburn, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie Calls His State's Teachers Union
"Political Thugs," ABC NEWS (Apr. 6, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/jersey-governorchris-christie-calls-teachers-union-political/story?id=I 3310446#.Trl 65_Qr2so.
6. The Moderate Voice, Chris Christie Tells Teacher She Doesn't Have to Teach, YOuTUBE
(May 26, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=awOaBkt8CPA&feature=player embedded.
7. Amy Bingham, Teachers' Union Endorses Obama Despite Hating His Politics, ABC
2011),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/obama-passes-teachers-testbarely/
NEWS
(July
6,
story?id=14003658.
8. 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13(b)(2.10) (LexisNexis 2011) (requiring a strike vote of
75% of bargaining unit members); Trip Gabriel, Teachers Wonder, Why the Scorn?, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2011,
at Al,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/education/
03teacher.html?emc=etal; S.B. 736, 2011 Leg., 113th Sess. (Fla. 2011) (enacted).
9. 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13(b)(2.10).
10. Amanda Paulson, Rhode Island School to Rehire Fired Teachers, Shelving Drastic Plan,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 17, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.comfUSA/Education/2010/0517/
Rhode-Island-school-to-rehire-fired-teachers-shelving-drastic-plan.
11. Gabriel, supra note 8, at Al.
12. S.B. 736, 2011 Leg., 113th Sess. The Florida Education Association has filed a lawsuit
claiming that the law violates Florida's Constitution. See generally Complaint, Robinson v.
Robinson, Case No. 2011-CA-2526 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 14, 2011), available at
http://www.meyerbrookslaw.com/documents/Robinson%20vs%20Robinson/Robinson v Robinson
_Complaint.pdf.
13. A. 40, 2011-2012 Leg. (Wis. 2011) (enacted); Wisconsin Act 10, BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/WisconsinAct_ 10,_the_%22ScottWalker BudgetRepair
Bill%22_%282011%29 (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).

HeinOnline -- 43 U. Tol. L. Rev. 565 2011-2012

UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

among other measures targeted at teachers' pay and working conditions.1 4 While
reform attempts in these states were among the most publicized, they were far
from the only state-law reforms targeting public-sector employees;
such
15
measures were either proposed or enacted in a number of other states.
As teachers' statutory and contractual protections-including their statutory
rights to bargain collectively with their employers-are eroded, their
constitutional rights will become increasingly relevant. In other words, as it
becomes less likely that teachers will benefit from protections beyond those
established by the Constitution, the precise location of the constitutional floor
becomes more important.
In the next section, I will trace the contours of a teacher's First Amendment
rights, which will become increasingly relevant as various legal reforms render
teachers' unions unable to negotiate contractual protections for teachers'
classroom speech.

II. THE LAW GOVERNING TEACHERS' SPEECH RIGHTS
One might expect the federal Constitution to play a significant role in
protecting teachers' classroom speech. After all, it is well-established that public
employees do not give up their First Amendment rights in exchange for their
paychecks.1 6 And, compared to other public-sector employers, it is intuitively
more likely that teachers will need to invoke their First Amendment rights: not
only do teachers speak for a living, but parents may be particularly attuned to
perceived professional missteps regarding their children's education, and
therefore more likely to report teachers' arguably poor performance than that of
other public employees.
Unsurprisingly, there exists a substantial body of law regarding teachers'
First Amendment rights. 7 Cases involving teachers and the First Amendment
have arisen most often in the context of curricular speech, which is the primary
focus of this article.

14. S.B. 5, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (enacted but overturned by voter
referendum), available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BilText129/129_SB_5 ENN.pdf.
See also Laura A. Bischoff, Stakes Highfor Both Sides in SB 5 Battle, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Sept.
18, 2011, http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/politics/stakes-high-for-both-sides-in-sb-5-battle1255054.html (describing provisions of SB 5).
15. See, e.g., Trip Gabriel & Sam Dillon, G.O.P. Governors Take Aim at Teacher Tenure, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 1, 2011, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20ll/02/01/us/Oltenure.html
("Governors in Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Nevada and New Jersey have called for the elimination or
dismantling of tenure."); Neil King, Jr. et al., PoliticalFight Over Unions Escalates, WALL ST. J.,
Feb.
22,
2011,
at
Al,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB 10001424052748703800204576158851079665840.html.
16. E.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) ("[Plolicemen, like teachers and
lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights.").
17. See generally Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968);
Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of the Tipp City Exempted Viii. Sch. Dist., 624 F.3d 332 (6th Cir.
2010); Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007); Boring v.
Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998).
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Background: PublicEmployees' FirstAmendment Rights Generally

A.

The scope of public employees' First Amendment rights has evolved
considerably since Justice Holmes-then speaking for the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts-famously stated that a police officer who lost his job
after having engaged in political activity "may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."' 8 In this section, I
will review briefly modem Supreme Court case law assessing the extent to which
public employee speech is generally protected by the First Amendment.
1.

Pickering v. Board of Education

The Court's modem doctrine begins with Pickeringv. Board of Education
of Township High School District 205.19 Pickering involved a teacher who
successfully submitted a letter for publication to the editor of a local newspaper.'z
The letter arrived on the editor's desk in the wake of four public votes on a series
of proposed bond initiatives and tax increases designed to raise money for the
public school district. 21 Only one of the four passed, and the money raised as a
result had been earmarked to build two new schools.22 The last of the four votes
had been contentious, and in the lead-up to it, the local paper had published "a
variety of articles attributed to the District 205 Teachers' Organization," which
encouraged the public to vote in favor of the proposal. 23
Mr. Pickering's letter addressed this chain of events.2 4 Among other things,
it insinuated that the School District had misused funds allocated through the
second bond initiative to build a school auditorium and athletic field. 25 It also
charged that the letters attributed to the District 205 Teachers' Organization had
misstated some key facts and omitted others, and that in any event, they did not
represent the views of most teachers2 6 Finally, Pickering launched a broad
attack on the School District's priorities, suggesting that District 205 prioritized
athletics over ensuring that teachers had adequate resources with which to meet

18. McAuliffe v. Mayor and Bd. of Alderman of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass.

1892).
19. See generally Pickering,391 U.S. 563.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 575-78.
Id. at 565-66.
Id.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 575-76.

25. Id. The letter specifically noted:
Lockport West has both an auditorium and athletic field. In fact, Lockport West has a better

athletic field than Lockport Central. It has a track that isn't quite regulation distance even
though the board spent a few thousand dollars on it. Whose fault is that? Oh, I forgot, it
wasn't supposed to be there in the first place. It must have fallen out of the sky.
Id.
26. Id. at 576.
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students' basic instructional needs. 27 He closed his letter by charging that the
Board of Education was "trying to push tax-supported athletics down our
throats. 28 He also explained that he was signing his letter in his capacity as a
citizen, rather than a teacher, because "that freedom [to sign letters critical of the
capacity as a teacher] has been taken from the teachers by
school district in his
' 29
the administration."
Unsurprisingly, the School Board of District 205 was displeased by
Pickering's letter, and it fired him from his teaching position shortly after
discovering the letter.30 Following a mandatory hearing, the Board (which itself
conducted the hearing) concluded that Pickering's termination was justified
because the letter contained false statements of fact, which would damage the
reputation of school officials and administrators and could disrupt teacher
discipline.3 1 However, the District did not find that the letter had already
disrupted school discipline or that
32 the letter had any particular effect on the
community or the school district.
Pickering unsuccessfully appealed his termination up through the Illinois
state courts, before reaching the United States Supreme Court.33 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the decision to terminate Pickering in retaliation for
his letter to the editor violated his First Amendment rights. 34 The Court's
holding rested primarily on two conclusions: first, that Pickering's letter was
."greeted ... with massive apathy and total disbelief;, 35 and second, that "the
question whether a school system requires additional funds is a matter of
legitimate public concern on which the judgment of the school administration ...
cannot, in a society that leaves such questions to popular vote, be taken as
conclusive." 36 Thus, the Court summarized the case, and its holding, as follows:
What we do have before us is a case in which a teacher has made erroneous public
statements upon issues then currently the subject of public attention, which are
critical of his ultimate employer but which are neither shown nor can be presumed
to have in any way either impeded the teacher's proper performance of his daily
duties in the classroom or to have interfered with the regular operation of the
schools generally. In these circumstances we conclude that the interest of the
school administration in limiting teachers' opportunities to contribute to public
27. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 577-78 (1968)
(reporting that the District was providing free lunches for athletes on game days, paying to
transport teams to and from matches, and paying for coaches' salaries and sports equipment while
"neglecting the wants of teachers" and failing to make needed physical improvements to school
facilities).
28. Id. at 578.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 566.
31. Id. at 567.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 575.
35. Id. at 570.
36. Id. at 571.
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debate is not significantly greater than37 its interest in limiting a similar contribution
by any member of the general public.
Put another way, the Pickering Court concluded that when a public school
teacher speaks in his capacity as a citizen, his employer may not punish him in
his capacity as teacher, at least when the speech does not disrupt the orderly
administration of government.3 8 When the same speech disrupts the employer's
operations, however, then courts must balance "the interests of the teacher, as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interests of the
the efficiency of the public services it
State, as an employer, in promoting
39
performs through its employees."
Thus, the Pickering decision accomplished two key things. First, it
established that public employees sometimes speak as citizens, and sometimes
speak as public employees-and on which side of that line a particular utterance
falls is critical to determining whether the speaker can be punished by his or her
employer. Second, even when public employees speak in their capacities as
citizens, their governmental employers can nonetheless punish their speech if it is
sufficiently disruptive.
On the other hand, Pickering left open at least two important questions.
First, upon which subjects might public employees' speech qualify as matters of
public concern? Second, what protection is available to individuals who speak in
their capacities as employees? The Court turned to those questions in two
subsequent cases.
2.

Connick v. Myers

Whereas Pickering started with a teacher writing a letter to an editor,
Connick started with an Assistant District Attorney in New Orleans, Shelia
Myers, circulating a questionnaire to her officemates. She did so after learning
that she was to be transferred to prosecute cases in a less desirable section of the
criminal court.4 '

After hearing of the impending transfer, Myers attempted to

obtain relief from her supervisors.42 However, when that failed, she prepared and
circulated within her office a questionnaire seeking her co-workers' views on
"office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the
level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work
in political campaigns. ' 'A3 Myers's supervisors quickly learned that she had
distributed the questionnaire, an act that one supervisor referred to as "creating a

37. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968).
38. Id. at 574 ("Absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a
teacher's exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for
his dismissal from public employment.").
39. Id. at 568.
40. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140-41 (1983).
41. Id. at 140.
42. Id. at 140-41.
43. Id. at 141.
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'mini-insurrection. ' '' 44 Myers was then fired, in part for resisting the transfer, but
also because her distribution of the questionnaire was deemed insubordinate.45
The Supreme Court began by addressing whether Myers's questionnaire
was speech on a matter of public concern,46 which was to be determined based on
"the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole
record." 47 Conducting that inquiry, the Court concluded that, "with but one
Myers's questionnaire fell short of addressing matters of public
exception,
concern:
We view the questions pertaining to the confidence and trust that Myers' coworkers possess in various supervisors, the level of office morale, and the need for a
grievance committee as mere extensions of Myers' dispute over her transfer to
another section of the criminal court.... [W]e do not believe these questions are of
public import in evaluating the performance of the District Attorney as an elected
official. Myers did not seek to inform the public that the District Attorney's Office
was not discharging its governmental responsibilities in the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases. Nor did Myers seek to bring to light actual or
potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the part of Connick and others.
Indeed, the questionnaire, if released to the public, would convey no information at
all other than the fact that a single employee is upset with the status quo. While
discipline and morale in the workplace are related to an agency's efficient
performance of its duties, the focus of Myers' questions is not to evaluate the
performance of the office but rather to gather ammunition for another round of
controversy with her superiors. These questions reflect one employee's
dissatisfaction
with a transfer and an attempt to turn that displeasure into a cause
49
cel~bre.

Thus, the Court gave at least a partial answer to the first question left open
in Pickering: matters of public concern include, at minimum, the performance of
elected officials; allegations that governmental entities are failing to discharge
their duties; breaches of the public trust; and whether an agency is efficiently
performing its duties. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Myers's question
about whether employees ever felt pressured to work on political campaigns

44. Id.
45. Id.

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 143.
Id. at 147-48.
Id. at 148.
Id.
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addressed an issue of public concern. ° In contrast, matters of purely private
concern include individual employees' workplace disputes with their managers.5
Because Myers's questionnaire included some material that spoke to a
matter of public concern, the Court engaged in Pickering balancing. 2 There, the
Court concluded that Myers's side of the scale was light: her speech involved a
matter of public concern only tangentially, and moreover, her questionnaire was
distributed only at her workplace, during working hours.53 Further, it was fueled
by a workplace dispute instead of "purely academic interest." 54 Thus, the Court
concluded that the District Attorney acted within his rights when he fired
Myers. 5
Accordingly, Myers established that, subject to limited exceptions, speech
about employment disputes receives very little protection-only rarely will it be
deemed a matter of public concern. This is consistent with the Court's
conclusions in other First Amendment contexts that speech about workof less social
especially speech about pay and other working conditions-is
56
significance than speech about other types of social issues.
3.

Garcetti v. Ceballos

Finally, in Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court addressed speech falling within
the scope of a public employee's job duties. 57 The dispute that gave rise to the
case began when Richard Ceballos, a deputy district attorney for Los Angeles
County, came to believe that an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant was
flawed and possibly based on misrepresentations.5 8 Ceballos informed his
superiors about his concerns and recommended in a written memorandum that

50. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983) (reasoning that "official pressure upon
employees to work for political candidates not of the worker's own choice constitutes a coercion of
belief in violation of fundamental constitutional rights," and thus that "there is a demonstrated
interest in this country that government service should depend upon meritorious performance rather
than political service.").
51. In this regard, the Court also differentiated personal workplace disputes from those where
"an employee speaks out as a citizen on a matter of general concern, not tied to a personal
employment dispute, but arranges to do so privately." Id. at 148 n.8 (citing Givhan v. W. Line
Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410,414-16 (1979)).
52. Id. at 149-50.
53. Id. at 152-53.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 146 (noting matters of public concern include "any matter of political, social, or other
concern to the community."). I have elsewhere documented that the Court regards speech about
working conditions, including speech that occurs when unions publicize labor disputes with
employers, as meriting less First Amendment protection than the speech in which other social
movements engage. See generally Charlotte Garden, Labor Values Are FirstAmendment Values:
Why Union Comprehensive CampaignsAre ProtectedSpeech, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 2617 (2011);
Charlotte Garden, Citizens, United & Citizens United: The Future of Labor Speech Rights?, 53
WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1 (2011).

57. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006).
58. Id. at 414.
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the case be dismissed.5 9 In response to this memorandum, a meeting was
convened at which Ceballos and other representatives of the DA's office, along
with members of the Los Angeles Sheriffs office, were present. That meeting
became heated, but did not result in dismissal of the charges that arose from the
problematic affidavit. 60 Ceballos was later called as a witness for the defense at a
motion hearing. At that hearing, Ceballos testified about his concerns, but the
defense's motion was denied.6 1
Following these events, Ceballos was reassigned to a different position
within the DA's office, transferred to work in another courthouse, and denied a
promotion. 62 He then filed suit, alleging that these actions were taken to retaliate
against him because he voiced his concerns about the affidavit to his superiors
and then, as a consequence, at the court hearing.63
Thus, Garcetti presented a different issue than Myers, as Ceballos's speech
was almost unquestionably a matter of public concern. Not only did his speech
concern possible police misconduct, but it did so at a time when corruption
within the Los Angeles Police Department was already in the news: around the
same time Ceballos wrote his initial memorandum, the Rampart Independent
Review Panel released a report faulting the LAPD for providing lax supervision,
which had resulted in massive police misconduct. 64 However, Ceballos's speech
was different in character than either Pickering's or Myers's-whereas their
speech unquestionably fell outside the scope of their job duties,6 5 his speech was
part of what he was paid to do.
The Court began by clarifying the relevant inquiries under Pickering: "The
first [step] requires determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a
matter of public concern. If the answer is no, the employee has no First
Amendment cause of action based on his or her employer's reaction to the
speech. If the answer is yes, then the possibility of a First Amendment claim
arises., 66 The first step turned out to be dispositive-Ceballos was not speaking
''as a citizen," when he "wrote his disposition memo because that is part of what
he, as a calendar deputy, was employed to do."6 7 The Court reasoned that
"[riestricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee's professional
responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed
as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise68of employer control over what
the employer itself has commissioned or created.,

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 414-15.
62. Id. at 415.
63. Id.
64. Frontline Rampart Scandal Timeline, PBS (Mar. 18, 1997), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/lapd/scandal/cron.html.
65. Myers's speech took place at work, but was nonetheless unquestionably unauthorized.
66. Garcetti,547 U.S. at 418 (citations omitted).
67. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
68. Id. at 421-22.
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Notably for purposes of this article, the Court did allow for the possibility
that the analysis might be different in the context of public education: "There is
some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom
instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are not ful1J
accounted for by this Court's customary employee-speech jurisprudence."
However, the Court left for another day both the likely validity of that argument
or the scope of the possible "additional constitutional interests."
Thus, where an employee speaks pursuant to his or her official job duties,
the speech is essentially attributable to the government and is therefore subject to
governmental control. Moreover, this is the case even if the speech relates to a
matter of public concern and is not actually or potentially disruptive, as was true
of Ceballos's speech. Finally, this analysis is subject to the caveat that, in an
academic setting, there might be additional considerations that are relevant to the
First Amendment calculus.
While the Supreme Court has not set forth a comprehensive analysis of
teachers' First Amendment rights, the issue has arisen in the lower courts. Those
cases are the subject of the next section.
B.

CurricularSpeech

Consider the following three examples, each of which involves a teacher
fired from her job after school administrators received complaints about the
teacher's in-class speech.
First, a respected drama teacher selects a play for her class to perform at a
state-wide competition. 70 The play "depicts the dynamics within a dysfunctional,
single-parent family-a divorced mother and three daughters; one a lesbian,
another pregnant with an illegitimate child., 71 After receiving a complaint from
a parent, the school principal transfers the teacher to a different school, in part
because of her failure "to follow the school system's controversial materials
policy" in staging the play.72
Second, in response to a student's question, a teacher informs her class that
she honks her car horn in support of protestors calling for an end to the Iraq war.
Parents complain to the school administration, which instructs teachers not to
take sides in political controversies.73 The teacher is then fired, apparently in
retaliation for her in-class comment.
And third, parents complain that their children were assigned a
controversial book. Despite the fact that the school board had purchased the
book in the first place, the school decides not to renew the teacher's appointment
for the following school year.74
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
335-36

Id. at 425.
Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 366 (4th Cir. 1998).
Id.
Id. at 367.
Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 478 (7th Cir. 2007).
Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of the Tipp City Exempted Viii. Sch. Dist., 624 F.3d 332,
(6th Cir. 2010).
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In each of these cases, a federal appeals court held that the school district
was entitled to punish the teacher's speech. However, as will be explained in
greater detail below, each court's reasoning articulated a slightly different view
of the appropriate First Amendment analysis and, in particular, the relevance of
the fact that the public-employee plaintiff was a teacher.
1.

Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education

In 1991, Margaret Boring, a high school drama teacher in North Carolina,
assigned the play Independence to students enrolled in her advanced acting
class. 75 The students performed the play at a regional competition where they
won 17 of the available 21 awards.76 Then, before reprising their performance in
a state-wide competition, the students performed the play for an English class at
Boring's school." Though Boring informed the teacher of that class that the play
dealt with mature themes and suggested that students get their parents'
permission before seeing the play, a parent of one of the students in the English
class nonetheless later complained to the school principal about the play's
content.7 The principal responded by requiring Boring to eliminate
79 portions of
the play from future performances; Boring complied with this edict.

But this was not the end of the School District's response; Boring was later
transferred to another school for the following school year. 80 Before the transfer
was effectuated, she received a hearing before the Board of Education. 8 1 That
hearing was the subject of much public debate, and some participants in that
debate expressed the view that "the play was obscene and that she was
immoral."
After the Board upheld the transfer, Boring sued, claiming First
Amendment retaliation. 83 The district court dismissed Boring's complaint, and
Boring appealed to the Fourth Circuit. 84 That court initially reversed the district
court, but then accepted the case for rehearing en banc85
By a narrow majority, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court. The
majority began by stating that Boring's selection of Independence "does not
present a matter of public concern and is nothing more than an ordinary
employment dispute."
Thus, the court concluded that there was no need to
perform Pickering balancing and based that conclusion on the fact that the
75. Boring, 136 F.3d at 366.
76. Id.
77. Id.

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 366-67 (4th Cir. 1998).

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
at 367.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ld.
Id.at 368. The majority opinion was written by Judge Widener and joined by six other

judges; six judges dissented. Id.at 365.

87. Id.
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dispute-the legality of the decision to transfer Boring to another schoolconcerned the terms of Boring's employment.88 The court presumably deemed
irrelevant and thus did not assess whether the appropriateness of Independence
for high school students was a matter of public concern.
The conclusion that the case was nothing more than a private employment
dispute was itself a sufficient basis on which to affirm the district court.
Nonetheless, the majority went on to consider the legal significance of the fact
that Boring was a teacher. It began by rejecting the view that teachers have a
First Amendment right to "participate in the makeup of the high school
curriculum." 89 The court reasoned that while it was true that "[s]omeone must
fix the curriculum," 90 it preferred to vest that responsibility in "local school
91
authorities who are in some sense responsible, rather than to the teachers."
While the majority did not say to whom the local school authorities were
responsible, both context and the concurring opinions suggest the answer-local
school authorities must answer to voters, who generally elect school board
members.92
This conclusion is somewhat surprising because the school district did not
select the play to be performed by Boring's advanced acting class. To the
contrary, it implicitly delegated that decision to Boring, who followed her usual
practice of selecting a play and informing the school principal of the play's name
(but no other information about the play).93 Further, at least at the motion to
dismiss stage, the Fourth Circuit was required to assume that Boring violated no
school policy in selecting the play. 94 Thus, the Boring majority did not conclude
simply that teachers could be required to follow the curriculum chosen by school
administrators. Rather, it must have also concluded that school boards could
delegate curricular decisions to teachers and then punish those teachers for
selecting materials with unpopular messages-even if the materials were
pedagogically appropriate (or even award-winning). In the words of the Boring
dissenters, the School District was free to "target[] Margaret Boring as a
scapegoat and use[] her to shield them from the 'heat' of the negative outcry
resulting from the performance of Independence. 95

88. See id. at 369 ("Since plaintiffs dispute with the principal, superintendent of schools and
the school board is nothing more than an ordinary employment dispute, it does not constitute
protected speech and has no First Amendment protection.").
89. Id. at 370.
90. Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 371 (4th Cir. 1998).
91. Id.
92. In particular, West Virginia school board members are elected. Selection of Local School
Boards, NSBA, http://www.nsba.org/SchoolLaw/Issues/Govemance/electionschart.pdf
(last
updated June 2009). See also Boring, 136 F.3d at 371-72 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) ("The
curricular choices of the schools should be presumptively their own-the fact that such choices
arouse deep feelings argues strongly for democratic means of reaching them.").
93. Boring, 136 F.3d at 366.
94. See id. at 367 (explaining that the School District alleged Boring had violated the school's
policy on "controversial materials," but that Boring alleged that at the relevant time, that policy did
not cover dramatic presentations).
95. Id. at 374 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
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Mayer v. Monroe County Community School Corp.

Deborah Mayer, a probationary elementary school teacher, answered a
student's question by stating that she "honked for peace" when she passed antiwar demonstrators. 9 After receiving complaints from parents, the principal at
Mayer's school first instructed teachers "not to take sides in any political
controversy," and then terminated Mayer's employment at the end of the school
year.97 Like Margaret Boring, Mayer sued, 98claiming that the school district's
decision violated her First Amendment rights.
Unlike Boring, Mayer reached the appeals court after the Supreme Court's
decision in Garcetti.99 Applying that case, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
"the school system does not 'regulate' teachers' speech as much as it hires that
speech."' 0 0 Thus, Mayer's status as a public employee, coupled with the fact that
her remark about honking for peace came in the context of teaching a lesson,
doomed her claim.
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Mayer court also concluded that the fact that
this case arose in the context of public education only served to underscore the
need for school board control over Mayer's speech:
Children who attend school because they must ought not be subject to teachers'
idiosyncratic perspectives. Majority rule about what subjects and viewpoints will
be expressed in the classroom has the potential to turn into indoctrination; elected
school boards are tempted to support majority positions about religious or patriotic
subjects especially. But if indoctrination is likely, the power should be reposed in
someone the people can vote out of office, rather than tenured teachers. At least the
board's views can be debated openly, and the people may choose to elect persons
committed to neutrality on contentious issues.
Thus, the Mayer court recognized that a probable outcome of its holding
was that school boards, facing pressure from parents, would be inclined to punish
teachers who expressed unpopular views in the classroom, 10 2 even when, as here,
the relevant speech was pedagogically appropriate and had not been proscribed
by the school. Yet, the court held that this outcome was preferable to any
alternative, because it reflected a democratically-elected body's responsiveness
to some portion of the electorate.103

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 478 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id.
Id.
Id.at 477; Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 410 (2006).
Mayer, 474 F.3d at 479.
Id. at479-80.
Id.
Id.
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Evans-Marshall v. Board of Education

In Evans-Marshall, the most recent of the three examples outlined in this
section, the appeals court arrived at a similar conclusion via a slightly different
route. Shelley Evans-Marshall taught English to high school students. As part of
her ninth grade class, she "distributed a list compiled by the American Library
Association of the '100 Most Frequently Challenged Books"' and asked groups
of students to "pick a book from the list, [] investigate the reasons why the book
was challenged and to lead an in-class debate about the book."' 1 4 Two groups of
students chose Heather Has Two Mommies, and when the parents of one of the
students complained, the school principal told Evans-Marshall to tell the students
to choose a different book.10 5 Evans-Marshall also assigned her students to read
Siddhartha, which she used for in-class discussions about "spirituality,
growth, [and] familial
Buddhism, romantic relationships, personal
relationships."'' 0 6 Significantly, the School District itself
10 7 had purchased copies of
that book several years earlier for use in classrooms.
At two subsequent school board meetings, parents complained about EvansMarshall's assignments; the second meeting was attended by "[n]early 100
parents, as well as the local news media."'' 0 8 Later, a group of parents presented
the board with a 500-signature petition calling for "decency and excellence" in
the classroom. 0 9 That year, the school principal evaluated Evans-Marshall's
performance and criticized her for "[u]se of material that is pushing the limits of
community standards."' 10 Then, Evans-Marshall was told that she would not be
invited back at the end of the school year."' She sued, claiming her First
Amendment
11 2 rights were violated, but lost in the district court on summary
judgment.
The Sixth Circuit noted that it faced "two competing intuitions:" first, that
teachers "have the First Amendment right to choose [their] own reading
assignments;" and second, that "a school board ha[s] the final say over what is
taught.' 11
' 3 To resolve those intuitions, the Court began with the Pickering
analysis. It concluded that Evans-Marshall's speech was a matter of public
concern in large part because of its curricular nature, as evidenced by the large
number of parents in attendance at the second school board meeting.' 14 Thus,
unlike the Boring court, which focused on the subsequent employment dispute in
104. Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of the Tipp City Exempted Viii. Sch. Dist., 624 F.3d 332,
335 (6th Cir. 2010).
105. Id.

106. Id.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
338-39

Id. at 339.
Id. at 335.
Id.
Id. at 336.
Id.
Id. at 336-37.
Id.
Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of the Tipp City Exempted Viii. Sch. Dist., 624 F.3d 332,
(6th Cir. 2010).
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assessing whether Boring's speech was a matter of public concern, the EvansMarshall court focused on the underlying curricular dispute. After concluding
that Evans-Marshall spoke on a matter of public concern, the court conducted
Pickering balancing and concluded that there was at least an issue for trial as to
whether the school district's interests in having Evans-Marshall refrain from
teaching a book that the district itself had previously purchased outweighed
Evans-Marshall's First Amendment interests. 1
Nonetheless, the court ruled against Evans-Marshall once it got to the
Garcetti analysis.' 16 Citing Mayer, the Sixth Circuit concluded that EvansMarshall had no right to "dictate the school's curriculum," and therefore her First
Amendment claim failed. 7 The Sixth Circuit's focus was on the need for
community control of curriculum:
State law gives elected officials-the school board-not teachers, not the chair of a
department, not the principal, not even the superintendent, responsibility over the
curriculum. This is an accountability measure, pure and simple, one that ensures
the citizens of a community have a say over a matter of considerable importance to
education-by giving them control over
many of them-their children's
118
membership on the board.
Thus, in a merging of the "democratic control" and the "public employee"
themes, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the democratically-elected school board
was Evans-Marshall's employer, and therefore the First Amendment "ha[d]
nothing to say about" its decision to fire her. 19
These cases illustrate courts' approaches to the question of the scope of
teachers' First Amendment rights. Specifically, courts analyze the relationship
between schools and teachers through two lenses. First, teachers are employees,
and therefore their on-the-job speech is subject to control by their school district
employers. To some judges, like the majority in Boring, this analysis means that
teachers' curricular speech does not rise to the level of a matter of public
concern.
Second, schools-and by extension, teachers-are charged with
implementing the vision of the local electorate. Therefore, courts often conclude,
democratic accountability requires that school boards be able to transfer or
terminate teachers in response to public outcry. Thus, the fact that teachers are
carrying out an important democratic mission means that even if the PickeringConnick-Garcetti analysis did not divest teachers of First Amendment protection
for their curricular speech, their First Amendment rights could nonetheless be
sacrificed at the altar of popular control of public schools.
The latter point is particularly interesting in light of the Garcetti Court's
observation that it was at least a possibility that "expression related to academic
scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 339.
Id.at340.
Id.
Id.at341.
Id. at 342.
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that are not fully accounted for by this Court's customary employee-speech
jurisprudence., 120 The clear implication of that statement is that teachers' speech
might enjoy greater First Amendment protection than that of other public
12z
employees because of the social values associated with academic freedom.
However, post-Garcetticourts have generally concluded that the opposite is the
case in the context of K- 12 education-local democratic control over elementary
and secondary public education implicates a special need for increased employer
control over teachers' speech.
In sum, the First Amendment is an unlikely vehicle for courts to overturn
elected school boards' decisions to fire or discipline teachers because of their
speech. This is for at least two independent reasons: first, the Court's decision in
Garcetti v. Ceballos; and second, school boards' responsibility to reflect the
desires of the electorate. In the next section, I will discuss an alternative route
towards protecting teachers' reasonable pedagogical choices: collective
bargaining.
III. UNIONS AND TEACHERS' ACADEMIC FREEDOM

As the Boring, Mayer, and Evans-Marshallcases illustrate, current doctrine
permits school districts to discipline or fire teachers for their curricular choices
even when those choices are both the result of an explicit or implicit delegation
of authority, and pedagogically sound. And, as the same three cases illustrate,
this doctrine means that school districts are free to discipline or fire teachers in
order to appease vocal subsets of the voting public.
It is perhaps conceivable that the Court will clarify its dicta in Garcetti
regarding the special First Amendment interests that may be implicated in the
context of teachers' speech. The Court may conclude that teachers have broader
First Amendment rights than the lower courts have discerned. However, that
outcome seems unlikely at best, particularly in the context of elementary and
secondary education.
An alternate route to the same endpoint-protections from discipline or
firing for teachers who make legitimate pedagogical choices that do not
contravene school rules--could be achieved through collective bargaining, at
least in those school districts where bargaining is permitted. 22 Thus, unions can
and do negotiate "academic freedom" provisions that protect teachers' curricular
choices in at least some situations. For example, NEA affiliates have negotiated
120. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006).
121. For example, the American Association of University Professors defines the purpose of
academic freedom as the promotion of the common good, which "depends upon the free search for
truth and its free exposition." 1940 Statement of Principleson Academic Freedom and Tenure with
1970 Interpretive Comments, AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS,
available at
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contents/1940statement.htm (last visited Mar. 19,
2012).
122. Cf Ann C. Hodges, Lessons From the Laboratory: The Polar Opposites on the Public
Sector Labor Law Spectrum, CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 735, 751-54 (2009) (describing activities
and accomplishments of public sector unions in Virginia, where binding collective bargaining in
the public sector is not permitted).
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a variety of academic freedom provisions, ranging from general affirmations of
the importance of maintaining classroom atmospheres that "invite[] in-depth
study of the critical issues of the day" to a set of specific procedures governing
teachers' decision-making authority relating to curriculum issues, community
members' challenges to those decisions, and the like.1 23 These provisions
generally seek to balance the interests of teachers, students, and community
members, and make
clear that they do not abrogate school boards' authority to
124
set curriculum.
I propose that collectively bargained provisions125 protecting teachers who
make delegated curricular decisions without violating other school policies strike
an appropriate balance between the interests of teachers, parents, students, and
school administrators.
In particular, protecting teachers under these
circumstances would vindicate the same interests that are identified in the cases
addressing teachers' free speech rights, and at little cost. Those interests include
both the retention of school boards' abilities to set curriculum (and the ability of
the electorate to influence that curriculum), and the provision of competent and
professional instruction to students. Additionally, other benefits would likely
result, including improved predictability regarding what can be taught, a
decreased "chilling effect" that might otherwise dissuade teachers from
broaching important yet controversial subjects, and improvement in teachers'
abilities to train students for democratic citizenship. I will briefly discuss these
interests.
First, a collectively bargained academic freedom provision like the one I
describe above would preserve school board prerogative by protecting only those
teachers who act according to both the dictates of the school board and their
professional training. Teachers would not be free to disregard established
curriculum, but would be protected when, for example, they fill gaps in the
curriculum by adding age-appropriate reading material. Thus, school districts
would retain the authority to set curriculum prospectively, and to do so according
to the wishes of the electorate. That forward-looking authority could also be
flexible enough to extend to situations like the one that arose in Boring, in which
the principal responded to brewing public controversy by requiring Boring to
eliminate certain scenes from future performances of Independence. In other
words, disapproving parents and school administrators might lose the opportunity
to see teachers subjected to discipline, but they would retain the ability to
123. E-mail from Carolyn York, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, to author (Dec. 19, 2011, 17:52 PST) (on
file with the author) (providing sample academic freedom provisions from existing collective
bargaining agreements).
124. id.
125. To be sure, academic freedom provisions vary, and I do not purport to analyze the benefits
and drawbacks of particular language to which unions and school boards might agree. For
examples of the type of provisions that might be negotiated, the NEA has compiled a list of
academic freedom provisions contained in collective bargaining agreements applicable to highereducation settings. NAT'L EDUC. Ass'N, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS (Aug. 2006), available at http://www.nea.org/
assets/docs/HElacadfreedom.pdf. While these provisions all come from the tertiary education
context, they nonetheless provide instructive examples.
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advocate that particular material 26not be taught in the future, and even to intervene
in ongoing classroom activities.'
Importantly, the limited academic freedom protections described above
would not extend so far as to cover unreasonable classroom decisions. For
example, had Margaret Boring assigned Independence to a class of third-graders,
or failed to assign any play to her advanced drama class (perhaps in favor of
allowing the students more time to work on their homework for other classes),
school administrators would be free to take appropriate disciplinary action. That
is to say, school boards and communities are entitled to expect that teachers will
to
make delegated decisions by exercising their best professional judgment, and 27
react to instances in which teachers' decisions are pedagogically inappropriate.1
Additionally, freeing teachers to make delegated decisions will promote
predictability and reduce the risk that teachers will be dissuaded from presenting
controversial material even when it is appropriate to do so. For example,
Margaret Boring could not have anticipated her involuntary transfer to a different
school when she selected Independence, particularly after she followed protocol
in selecting the play and her students took second place in the state drama
competition. That outcome resulted from an unanticipated outpouring of anger
from the parents of students who were not even in the advanced drama class.
Likewise, the school superintendent's observation in Evans-Marshall that the
school board's purchase of Siddhartha "ma[de] it difficult to criticize EvansMarshall for teaching [it]' 28 nonetheless did not prevent the same school board
from firing Evans-Marshall, apparently to appease a group of angry parents.
These outcomes implicate not only fairness, but also the educational choices that
other teachers will make in the future. Specifically, they are bound to have a
chilling effect, preventing teachers from using their professional judgment29to
decide what material to present in the classroom, to the detriment of students.'

126. Relatedly, protecting teachers in the limited circumstances outlined above could actually
serve the interests of school board members by limiting the pressure on them to take the extreme
step of dismissing a teacher, while still preserving their incentives to respond to community
interests. All other things being equal, rational school districts will likely prefer to retain the
services of dedicated, competent teachers who happen to incur community ire. If school districts
are precluded by collective bargaining agreements from punishing a given teacher for making a
pedagogically sound choice that he or she was free to make, it reduces the pressure on school board
members to choose between firing a teacher and saving their own seats on the school board. At the
same time, school boards will generally be free to preclude the teacher from making the same
choice in the future by affirmatively setting the curriculum in the area-thus vindicating
community interests in controlling what children are taught.
127. This is not to suggest that it will always be clear whether a particular decision is
pedagogically appropriate. However, the due process procedures to which teachers accused of
presenting inappropriate material in the classroom should be entitled is beyond the scope of this
article.
128. Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of the Tipp City Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist., 624 F.3d 332,
335 (6th Cir. 2010).
129. Kevin G. Welner, Locking Up the Marketplace of Ideas and Locking Out School Reform:
Courts' Imprudent Treatment of ControversialTeaching in America's Public Schools, 50 UCLA L.
REv. 959, 1015, 1024 (2003) (arguing that school reform efforts, including that of increasing
professionalization of teachers, suggest that teachers' speech should be more robustly protected
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Finally, giving teachers room to teach controversial (but age-appropriate)
material without fear of discipline could better prepare students for deliberative
citizenship. 130 If it is "commonplace that in this country, schools are supposed to
prepare young people to live and participate in a liberal democracy," 3 1 then
surely it is worthwhile for public school teachers to expose students to the types
of issues over which they will be expected to deliberate once they become full
participants in public life.' 32 Not only would students benefit from engaging in
civil discussion of controversial material among themselves, but they may also
have the opportunity to witness ensuing community discussion and school board
reaction, which would necessarily take place pursuant to the procedural rules and
limitations set forth in documents including the collective bargaining agreement.
Thus, collectively bargained protections for teachers' academic freedom are
consistent with the interests articulated in cases discussing First Amendment
protections for teachers. Additionally, they could yield several other benefits that
inure to parents and students, as well as teachers themselves.
CONCLUSION

In this article, I explore some of the ways in which the First Amendment, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals, provides suboptimal protection for teachers' speech. Specifically, courts' deference to elected
school boards permits school districts to punish teachers for making reasonable
curricular decisions that later prove to be unpopular. This deference is
detrimental to not only teachers but also many students and parents, and even the
long-term interests of the districts themselves. However, it need not be this way:
public school teachers' speech could receive additional protection through
collectively bargained academic freedom provisions. Thus, the continuing public
debate over the appropriate role of public-sector unions should take into account
the ability of unions to negotiate provisions that not only provide needed
protections for public employees, but also promote the public interest.

under the First Amendment). Relatedly, students may benefit by the improved retention of
qualified teachers who might otherwise be fired, or even quit due to demoralization.
130. The empirical basis for this claim is beyond the scope of this article. However, other
scholars have made a strong case for this proposition. See generally AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC
EDUCATION (1999); Betsey Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between
Authority and Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647 (1986); Jeffrey J. Pyle,
Socrates, the Schools, and Civility: The Continuing War Between Inculcation and Inquiry, 26 J.L.
& EDUC. 65 (1997).
131. Steven D. Smith, Educating for Liberalism, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1039, 1041 (Feb.
2009).
132. Hinckley A. Jones-Sanpei, Public School Segregation and Social Capital, 12 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 329, 334 (2009) ("A functioning democracy relies on the ability of its members to
show mutual respect, tolerance, and deliberation-skills that promote social capital. Students
traditionally practice civic skills, taught in schools and homes, at school.
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